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“Nothing is more distressing to those who have a due respect for the constitutional modifications 
of power than to be obliged to decide on them.” 
- James Madison, Virginia Delegate, January 22, 1782  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“The Only True American Republic”: Vermont Independence and the Development of 
Constitutional Government in the Early United States 
1. Introduction 
 Institutions of constitutional government in the United States were not created within a 
vacuum; rather, these institutions resulted from a complicated historical context.  Unanticipated 
and unprecedented circumstances filled the era of the American Revolution and Confederation.  
The individuals responsible for making decisions during this era faced the task of establishing 
the fundamental bases of a new nation.  In doing so, they based their decisions upon both the 
zeitgeist of Whig political ideology that permeated the period and the exigencies of fighting a 
war and building a nation, all at once.  The tension between the idealistic and the pragmatic 
outcome defined the decision-making process.  The controversy over Vermont which took place 
in the Continental Congress from 1778 to 1789 created this tension.  According to Peter S. Onuf, 
“jurisdictional confusion created a mandate for a stronger central government.”   Before a 1
stronger central government could be formed, delegates would be forced to handle the Vermont 
controversy. 
 From 1750 until Vermont entered the Union in 1791, New York, New Hampshire, and the 
self-proclaimed Vermonters struggled for jurisdiction over the territory and whether the right to 
form a sovereign state through revolution existed.   In 1778 New Hampshire delegate William 2
Whipple wrote that he was  “much inclined to think the western part of the State will be kept in a 
 Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United 1
States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 3.
 The term Vermont is used to describe the disputed territory between New York and New 2
Hampshire.  At different times, it was known to contemporary audiences as the New Hampshire 
Grants, New Connecticut, and Vermont.  It is here called Vermont for the sake of consistency.
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perpetual Broil ‘till a final settlement of the Jurisdiction.”   Over time, Whipple’s prediction 3
proved correct.  The Vermont controversy proved to delegates in Congress how weak and 
divisive the Articles of Confederation could be.  Vermont as a case study also shows that 
delegates to Congress had an unclear view of their own institutional power.  Ultimately, they 
would be forced to define the limits of their own power to define states.  This struggle to 
understand the power of their own institution proved critical to the development and function of 
the federalist institutions created by the 1787 United States Constitution. 
 This paper analyzes the debates over the Vermont controversy in the Continental 
Congress which illuminate a broader debate about congressional power and the key problems of 
American federalism.  Through a study of secondary source material on the development of the 
American republic, an analysis of the internal politics of New York and Vermont as the 
controversy developed, and an analysis of the letters to and from delegates to Congress, this 
paper argues that the Continental Congress questioned its own ability to take any decisive action.  
That realization, in turn, led to a failure to resolve the issue until after the ratification of the 1787 
Constitution.  In its conclusion, this paper analyzes how the Vermont issue affected the broader 
debate over the nature and limits of American federalism and the channels and limits of 
congressional power. 
2. Literature Review 
 William Whipple to Meshech Weare, December 4, 1778, in Paul Smith, et. al., eds. Letters of 3
Delegates to Congress, 25 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976-2000), 11: 339.  
Any spelling or grammatical errors found within these letters were left intact, so as to maintain 
them as written when quoted.  Some editor’s markings were removed to improve readability.  
Hereafter, letters from this collection will be cited as LDC.
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 Much like the Revolutionary and Founding eras, histories began to be written about the 
issue of Vermont independence before the dust of revolution had settled.  While publications 
exist from the nineteenth century—and they carried value as guides for later historians—those 
works do not stand out among more modern sources.  The most frequently cited monograph on 
the Vermont question was Chilton Williamson’s 1949 Vermont in Quandary: 1763-1825.   4
Inward-looking, this work focused more on the motives of land speculators in Vermont and the 
many forces that worked to create the conflict over land in Vermont.  Although it did not focus 
on the Continental Congress, later works treated Williamson’s work as an authority on the details 
of the conflict and especially so on the motives of Vermont’s leaders.  While they made a 
valuable contribution to the study of this issue, historians such as Williamson’s work, Hilland 
Hall’s 1868 The History of Vermont From Its Discovery to Its Admission Into the Union in 1791,  5
Matt B. Jones’s 1939 Vermont in the Making: 1750-1777,  told the story from a local viewpoint.  6
To date, only a few historians have produced scholarship on the Vermont issue from an outside 
perspective. 
 In his 1955 University of Michigan dissertation “The Vermont Problem in the Continental 
Congress and in Interstate Relations, 1776-1787,”  Winn L. Taplin, Jr. offered one of the first 7
non-Vermont-based viewpoints on the Vermont issues.   Vermont authors constituted his main 8
 Chilton Williamson, Vermont in Quandary: 1763-1825 (Montpelier, VT: Vermont Historical 4
Society, 1949).
 Hilland Hall, The History of Vermont, From Its Discovery to Its Admission Into the Union in 5
1791 (Albany, NY: J. Munsell, 1868).
 Matt Bushnell Jones, Vermont in the Making: 1750-1777 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 6
Press, 1939).
 Winn L. Taplin, Jr., “The Vermont Problem in the Continental Congress and in Interstate 7
Relations, 1776-1787” (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1955).
 Ibid., 1.  In his first paragraph, Taplin acknowledged that he is the first non-local historian.  8
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secondary sources, but he made use of state archives and primary source material, including 
Edmund Burnett’s original 1921 Letters of Members of the Continental Congress,  in order to 9
develop his argument.  Perhaps Taplin’s most important contribution was his handling of the 
complicated power struggle that occurred within Vermont.  Taplin’s study explained why the 
issue cannot be viewed as a simple conflict between New York and the Vermont settlers.  
Because land speculation lay at the root of the original conflict, Taplin acknowledged the 
tensions between New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, and the College Party, a 
group that sought unity in the Connecticut River Valley.   Within these groups, a large cast of 10
characters—ranging from Founding Fathers to lesser-known Vermonters—dealt with the issue 
directly.  Despite a sometimes shaky and repetitive chronology, Taplin handled an often 
overwhelming amount of actors and historical development within his dissertation, and his work 
served as an excellent guide to the order in which the issues developed. 
 Taplin’s main argument—that the handling of the Vermont issue made Congress’s 
weaknesses evident—was important and another key to the usefulness of his work.  He stated 
that the issue was “never solved by the Continental Congress” because  “the revolt within a 
revolt was too much for its sketchy powers and internal jealousies.”   While weak national 11
government was a common and often over-emphasized theme in the nationalist-focused 
historiography of the era which highlighted the 1789 Constitution and treated the Articles of 
Confederation as a total failure, Taplin used the Vermont issue as an effective argument for an 
 Edmund Burnett, ed.  Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 8 vols. (Washington, 9
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1921).  This is the predecessor to the Letters of Delegates to the 




issue on which the government was ineffective.  Taplin’s argument about Congress’s “inability to 
resolve vital issues”  presented an important conclusion to be drawn from the Vermont issue.    12
 The most notable recent historical work regarding the Vermont issue is Onuf’s 1983 The 
Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787.   13
The Vermont issue was only one of many topics within the monograph, and in his introduction 
Onuf wrote of the underlying question in all of the jurisdictional disputes he discussed: “how to 
reconcile state and congressional authority and . . . how to provide for the interests of the states 
collectively and of the American people in general.”   Onuf cited jurisdictional disputes as a 14
definitive aspect of early American constitutional history and pointed to the power struggle as the 
key motivator of state interaction and government behavior.   Origins of the Federal Republic 15
had different utility than Taplin’s work due to the context in which it was created.  Because his 
work was published in 1983, 28 years after Taplin’s dissertation, Onuf’s work was a product of 
the major historiographical shift in the historiography of the American Revolution that had taken 
place in the time since Taplin’s work.  16
 In the chapter on the Vermont issue, Onuf agreed with Taplin’s assessment of Congress’s 
weakness.  Stating that “Vermont’s survival as a state was made possible by the inability of the 
claiming states to enforce their jurisdictional claims,”  he confirmed the lack of enforcement 17
power held in Congress.  However, Onuf went one step further than Taplin in discussing the 
 Ibid., 371.12
 Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic.13
 Ibid., xv.14
 Ibid., 3.15
 This historiographical shift will be discussed in depth below.16
 Ibid., 144.17
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tension between New York’s legal claim over Vermont and the revolutionary feeling of the age.  
This analysis pointed to the irony of congressional leaders—revolutionaries themselves—being 
asked to adjudicate between Vermont’s revolutionaries and New York territorial interests.  Onuf 
called Vermont “the only true American republic, for it alone had truly created itself.”   The 18
actions of Congress which New York desired, Onuf wrote, “sanctioned the exercise of state 
authority with the same supposedly arbitrary rationale that the British invoked against the states 
themselves.”   Onuf’s arguments were bold, and his work proved key to understanding the 19
Vermont issue in a broader context.   
 While historical writing with a specific Vermont focus is limited, historians have spilled 
enormous amounts of ink analyzing late-eighteenth century American politics.  Because the 
Vermont issues spanned from 1750 to 1791, all aspects of the Founding—independence, the 
Articles of Confederation, and the Constitutional Convention—required coverage.  In 1958, the 
same year that Taplin wrote his dissertation, Forrest McDonald published We the People: The 
Economic Origins of the Constitution,  a direct rebuttal to Charles Beard’s 1913 An Economic 20
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.   Widely accepted until 1958, Beard 21
credited economic interests as the motivating force behind the Founders; however, McDonald 
used archival research to discredit Beard’s thesis.  More significant to the present study was the 
historiographical shift caused by McDonald’s work.  The way in which historians studied the 
 Ibid., 145.18
 Ibid., 131.19
 Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago, IL: 20
University of Chicago Press, 1958).
 Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: The 21
Macmillan Company, 1913).
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Founding era underwent significant change in the mid-twentieth century; thus, most early works 
related to the Vermont issue lacked some depth because they were published before works like 
McDonald’s caused an historiographical shift. 
 The most relevant of McDonald’s work to the Vermont issue was the 1965 E Pluribus 
Unum: The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790.   In this monograph, McDonald 22
turned the motto—“E Pluribus Unum”—on its head by beginning with a chapter entitled “From 
One, Many.”  Crucial to the understanding of interstate relations in Congress in the Vermont 
issue, his argument centered around the sometimes sour relationships between states.  As he put 
the problem,  “the first enemy of the Republic to appear [on the political front]. . . was state 
jealousy.”   While McDonald’s support for the compact theory of the Union lay out of the 23
mainstream and was qualified by later works, his understanding of the behavior and interaction 
of state governments was indispensable.  McDonald depicted New York as one of the strongest 
early states under confident executive leadership,  which played a role during the height of the 24
Vermont issue and confirmed McDonald’s view that “different colonies had supported the 
revolution in support of different goals.”   His work allowed each state’s history and interests to 25
be brought into the broader analysis of power under the Articles of Confederation.  In later years, 
McDonald authored Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (1985),  26
 Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790 22




 Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 26
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985).
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a successor to another genre of history developed in the 1960s which also had an important 
impact on the study of the Vermont issue and the Founding era: ideological history.  
 The school of thought modern historians such as Onuf had the benefit of working from 
was the ideological or “republican consensus” history found most notably in Bernard Bailyn’s 
1967 Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.   With this starting point, historians began 27
to interpret the underlying ideas and values of American political leaders in the late eighteenth 
century.  While McDonald’s influence loomed large on the study of the Founding era, by 
comparison Bailyn’s has had a much stronger ripple effect across historical scholarship.  The 
product of an edited collection of revolutionary pamphlets, in Ideological Origins Bailyn found 
new evidence to prove his argument that ideas mattered.  Following his professor’s footsteps, 
Gordon S. Wood published his own 1969 volume, Creation of the American Republic 
1776-1787,  which folded into an argument similar to Bailyn's, with more emphasis on 28
extending opposition political theory. 
 In this work, and his 1992 work The Radicalism of the American Revolution,  Wood 29
further developed an understanding of the ideological origins of the Founding Era.  While Bailyn 
concerned himself with the lead-up to the American Revolution, Wood sought to understand the 
workings of a developing national government after the Revolution had concluded.  This task led 
to a discussion of state constitutions which was further analyzed in Pauline Maier’s 1997 
 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: 27
Harvard University Press, 1967).
 Gordon S.Wood, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1789, (Chapel Hill, NC: 28
University of North Carolina Press, 1969).  
 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 29
1992).
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American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence,  discussed below.  Wood focused 30
on the development of Vermont’s constitution in conjunction with the writing of other state 
constitutions.   In many ways, reading Wood’s descriptions of the national leaders of the 31
American Revolution as cautious and thoughtful figures—outside the typical mold of 
revolutionaries—is similar to discussing the revolutionaries who led the Vermont independence 
movement.   This similarity is unsurprising as Vermonters also believed in the revolutionary and 32
Whig ideas analyzed and described by Bailyn and Wood.  Wood’s works suggested that Vermont, 
while not officially a part of the new nation, developed as a part of a national movement towards 
the creation of a national, republican government influenced by eighteenth-century Whig ideas. 
 Maier also dealt with ideological history in her American Scripture, although the study 
concerned itself primarily with the road to creating the Declaration of Independence.  The 
monograph delved into the committee drafting process in addition to an interesting discussion of 
local declarations of independence which preceded the national declaration.  Maier also analyzed 
the role of the Second Continental Congress in the work of the nation including “the task of 
resolving internal disputes . . . of the settlers of Vermont with New York.”   At the time, it was 33
far less clear-cut whether interstate conflict resolution was found within the powers of the 
Continental Congress.  She pointed out, however, that the issue remained in play.  Key to 
understanding the lead-up to independence, her work lent itself to the underlying themes in the 
study of the Vermont issue.  However, she also discussed the Vermont issue specifically, tying 
 Pauline Maier, American Scripture, Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: 30
Vintage Books, 1997).
 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 161-63.31
 Wood, Radicalism, 3.32
 Maier, American Scripture, 13-14.33
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Vermont’s Declaration of Independence to the model Pennsylvania set  and relating Vermont’s 34
effort to create its own Constitution with the congressional Declaration of Independence.   Yet, 35
besides the obvious influence over individuals and the structures of government they created, 
why were the ideological origins important to the Vermont issue?  Because, as Onuf stated, 
Vermonters were no less affected by the Whig ideas flowing through the new nation.  While 
personal and property-based interests were an important cause of the conflict, the settlers in 
Vermont who declared independence also believed in independence from arbitrary rule and 
popular sovereignty located in “the people.”  In their own view, Vermonters sought freedom as 
Congress struggled to reconcile with the consequences of independence. 
 Understanding the Continental Congress as an institution is essential to an analysis of 
their handling of the Vermont issue.  The earliest secondary literature on this subject is Edmund 
C. Burnett’s 1941 The Continental Congress,  still a foundational text for a historian of this era.  36
Burnett is the same historian who published the original collection of letters of delegates to the 
Continental Congress, and his work is still used and respected by modern historians.  Burnett 
argued that the structures developed within the Continental Congress were integral to the 
creation of the United States of America.  The monograph tracks a positive growth of those 
structures.  While this work is a broad overview, Burnett also treated the Vermont question as a 
setback in this development adding that the region was “vexatious enough even in the earlier 
stages of fermentation and destined to torment the Continental Congress from time to time until 
 Ibid., 166-67.34
 Ibid., 275, see footnote 22.35
 Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941).36
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its last hours.”    This summary captured the relationship between Congress and Vermont to be 37
studied in the present work.  Burnett’s work and any other study that relied upon the first-hand 
accounts or correspondence of members of Congress, may be supplemented by Mary Sarah 
Bilder’s 2015 Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention.   This monograph was 38
unrelated to the Vermont question, as it focused on the Constitutional Convention notes; but, 
Section I, “Notes Before the Constitutional Convention,” was useful to understanding how the 
key figures of the era recorded the events in Congress.  Bilder’s work shed light on the 
composition of many of the primary sources used by Burnett and other historians of the era. 
 The 1783 Articles of Confederation, provided the framework for how Congress acted in 
this period.  One of the few monographs related to the Articles is Merrill Jensen’s 1940 The 
Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American 
Revolution 1774-1781.   Despite his tendency toward Beard’s school of thought, even 39
McDonald treated Jensen’s work as the standard on the Articles of Confederation, likely due to 
their agreement on the compact theory of union.  With a clear preference for the government 
under the Articles, Jensen called the Articles the “embodiment in form of the philosophy of the 
Declaration of Independence,”   making the assumption that the two documents settled the 40
ideological issues of the day.  Jensen furthered these views in his 1950 The New Nation: A 
 Ibid., 239.37
 Mary Sarah Bilder, Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention (Cambridge, 38
MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
 Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional 39




History of the United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789.   Focused on the main ten 41
years of what some call “the critical period,” Jensen described a nation at the end of the 
revolutionary war suddenly tasked with true self-governance.  “As the war ground to an end,” 
Jensen wrote, “American political leaders tried to solve what seemed to be insoluble 
problems.”   On the Vermont question, the monograph brushed over and oversimplified the 42
issue, saying the dispute was “solved” by the creation of an independent state.   However, much 43
like his original work, The New Nation covered important issues and power struggles between 
national and state interests.  These issues proved critical to both the Constitutional Convention 
and to understanding how the Vermont question was handled.   
 Jack P. Greene, in the 1982 “The Background of the Articles of Confederation,”  rejected 44
Jensen’s view of the Articles of Confederation and instead pointed to a nationalist theory.  
According to Greene, the compact theory made the line between state sovereignty and 
congressional power too clear cut when the distribution of power instead required analysis of the 
subtle meanings and actions behind the written documents.   The debate over compact theory 45
remained fierce, as even recent historians such as Derek H. Davis argued in 2000 that “the notion 
that the sovereignty of the Continental Congress was superior to that of the colonies/states, as 
some have sought to do, is indeed a misreading if not a revisionism of the worst kind.”   These 46
 Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789 41
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950).
 Ibid., 4.42
 Ibid., 337.  As more detailed secondary sources indicate, the creation of an independent 43
republic further complicated the Vermont dispute and did not solve it.
 Jack P. Greene, “The Background of the Articles of Confederation,” Publius 12, (1982): 15-44.44
 Ibid., 41.45
 Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Continental Congress, 1774-1789: Contributions to Original 46
Intent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 118.
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words were harsh and misguided, as Greene and other historians were the most-respected authors 
on this subject in recent years and their school of thought dominated the debate.  However, Davis 
leveled a fair criticism of the nationalist school as the proper answer lay somewhere in the 
middle.  A more recent historian, Aaron N. Coleman, also criticized the nationalist view in his 
2016 monograph, The American Revolution, State Sovereignty, and the American Constitutional 
Settlement, 1765-1800.   While he accepted some of Greene and McDonald’s arguments, he 47
wrote that the Founders established “state sovereignty as the bedrock of their constitutional 
order.”   While Coleman may be correct in that modern historians overlook state sovereignty, he 48
overstated their importance to the Founders.  The challenges of the 1780s which precipitated the 
Constitutional Convention and developed a nation make Jack N. Rakove’s arguments a more 
convincing view of the period.  
 In the key monograph on state and national power under the Continental Congress, 
Rakove, in The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental 
Congress (1979),  adopted a nationalist view but was moderate compared to Greene.  Rakove 49
was perhaps most clear in explaining why no defined scope of congressional authority existed.  
As the Vermont episode showed, Congress was in the process of experimenting and discovering 
what its role was in the new American system.  That experimentation, in many ways, was the 
value of the Confederation period: realizing the demands of what James Madison described as an 
 Aaron N. Coleman, The American Revolution, State Sovereignty, and the American 47
Constitutional Settlement, 1765-1800 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).
 Ibid., 1-10.48
 Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the 49
Continental Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).
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“extended republic.”   According to Rakove, most delegates “probably rejected . . . the inherent 50
sweep of congressional authority without giving up an intuitive belief that in certain critical cases 
Congress must reign supreme.”   Rakove’s arguments were valuable to understanding the era of 51
the Articles of Confederation, a critical time for Vermont’s efforts for statehood.  The day-to-day 
politics of the Confederation Congress, which he sought to understand, proved key in the 
Vermont issue. 
 Rakove also authored the 1996 Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of 
the Constitution,  for which he won the Pulitzer Prize.  Rakove sought to understand the 52
creation of the national government as part of a political and legal theory, similar to the earlier 
Beginnings of National Politics.  Especially interesting is the chapter on federalism, which 
acknowledged that “the existence of the states was simply a given fact of American governance, 
and it confronted the framers at every stage of their deliberations.”   Although it did not exist in 53
an official capacity, Vermont was perhaps one of the most complicated state-related issues that 
existed at the time of the framing.  The unsolvable Vermont question bothered members of 
Congress throughout their tenure and was on their mind when considering what kind of federal 
system should exist.  Rakove cited the Vermont question as one of the remaining controversies at 
the time of the framing of the Constitution.  As with many secondary sources described above, 
 James Madison, Federalist 10 in The Federalist Papers, ed. George W. Carey and James 50
McLellan (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc, 2001), 42-49.
 Rakove, Beginnings of National Politics, 184.  Coleman explicitly rejected Rakove’s argument 51
that sovereignty was not always a primary concern (Coleman, 4).
 Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 52
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
 Rakove, Original Meanings, 162.53
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this work lent perspective on how the framers thought about the largest issues of the era 
exemplified by the Vermont question.   
 The bulk of existing literature related to the Vermont issue is related to the Founding era 
in a general sense.  Whether discussing interstate relationships, ideological foundations, or the 
mechanics of the politics of the various forms of governments of the era, these historical works 
lent themselves to any discussion of the Vermont issue.  While the body of work dealing with the 
Vermont issues is small, historians such as Taplin and Onuf offer detailed, helpful information 
and arguments regarding the issue.  With these two existing bodies of literature, the foundation 
for a case study in the development of American federalism may be built.  However, any attempt 
to tie together the development of federalism and the resolutions of tensions in the Vermont issue 
must be made through textual analysis of primary source material.    
3. Early Context & Key Figures 
 While the Vermont controversy in the Continental Congress constitutes the focus of the 
present study, it is but one aspect of the Vermont controversy.  Its relationship to the 
establishment of a national legislature in the United States may be drawn from the interactions 
which took place within the Continental and Confederation Congresses; however, key events 
which shaped the question in Congress took place long before the delegates in Philadelphia took 
up the question.  In addition, key figures emerged throughout the colonies and in Vermont who 
played a role in the controversy throughout its discussion within Congress.  The context of the 
controversy before it reached Congress—from the the original New Hampshire Grants in 1750 to 
Vermont’s declaration of independence in 1777—is crucial to a full understanding of the issue as 
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it was placed before Congress.  This context includes the early development of the controversy 
and the individuals responsible for its precipitation. 
 As early as 1750, a conflict over disputed territory that would become Vermont arose 
between New York and New Hampshire.  In that year, New Hampshire’s royal governor Benning 
Wentworth began to challenge the boundaries between New York and New Hampshire.  
According to Taplin, in 1749 “Wentworth had written with a show of innocence to New York’s 
governor, George Clinton, to inquire how far New York extended to the east of the Hudson 
River.”   Despite receiving a clear answer from Clinton that the Connecticut River was the 54
boundary,  Wentworth created fifteen towns west of the river, with the town of Bennington as 55
close as 20 miles east of the Hudson River.   Wentworth awarded grants to 112 more towns by 56
1764, ignoring an agreement with New York to wait for a final resolution from England.   With 57
these actions taken, as Taplin noted, “trouble was inevitable.”   Out of the early stages of this 58
developing conflict arose a few key figures and interest groups. 
 From 1750 and throughout the early stages of the controversy, Wentworth was not only 
the main instigator of the illegal land grants, but a benefactor from it.  Although he knew a royal 
decision was forthcoming, Wentworth persisted in making grants across the Connecticut River.  
According to Edward P. Alexander’s 1966 A Revolutionary Conservative: James Duane of New 
York, “Wentworth could well afford to take a chance on the royal decision, because he received 
 This George Clinton, although distantly related to the better-known American politician, was 54
an older provincial governor.  The younger George Clinton would not be elected governor until 
1777.





two rights in each grant and his relatives and close friends were patentees.”   To bolster the 59
grants, Wentworth made the argument that New Hampshire stretched as far west as 
Massachusetts.  However, there was no legal basis for this argument and was based solely on his 
own interests, as he himself held approximately 65,000 acres of land in the New Hampshire 
Grant regions.   Wentworth’s early attitude toward the region set a precedent for constant 60
disagreement with the New York position, no matter the legal argument.  This self-interested 
behavior laid the groundwork for the future development toward Vermont independence.   
 In 1764, the British Privy Council reached what they thought was a final decision.  In that 
decision, the Privy Council determined the boundary of New York “to be” the Connecticut 
River.   After the decision of the Privy Council, land speculation and fees became a constant 61
underlying issue for all parties to the controversy, and while land speculation and fees fell out of 
focus in the later debates, they formed a key part of the context of the controversy.  The future-
tense language of the Privy Council ruling served to make the conflict worse.  Williamson 
accurately summarized the disagreement which surrounded the decision: “If this decision had 
declared merely that the Grants were transferred from the jurisdiction of New Hampshire to that 
of New York, the speculators in New Hampshire titles would have had little to fear.  But, 
unhappily for them, the wording of the decision provided New York with the opportunity to state 
that the lands in dispute had been under the jurisdiction of New York since 1664 and, hence, 
titles derived from New Hampshire were illegal.”   New Hampshire settlers did have some stake 62
 Edward P. Alexander, A Revolutionary Conservative: James Duane of New York (New York: 59
AMS Press, Inc., 1966), 69.
 Taplin, 4-6.60
 Ibid., 1. 61
 Williamson, 11.62
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in this land, as they had already developed some of it and paid fees to New Hampshire; thus, the 
fees associated with New York’s jurisdiction was one of their main concerns.  New York 
permitted original title-holders to maintain their lands, but they were unsatisfied with the high 
fees and did not take advantage of the offer until 1772, when New York reduced the price by 
half.   63
 Just as the New Hampshire leaders were the beneficiaries of the original grants, New 
York land speculators were elated at the opportunity to gain from the language of the Privy 
Council ruling.  New York officials were set to earn new fees from the territory and speculators 
would gain the fertile lands of the territory.   A New York speculator who acquired 67,000 acres 64
altogether,  James Duane was chief among the group disputing the New Hampshire Grants and 65
was supportive of New York claims in the territory.  He would later become a leader on the issue 
as a New York delegate to Congress.  Unlike their New Hampshire foes, New York speculators 
armed themselves with four key traits, as defined by Alexander. He wrote that they were girded 
with “wealth, prestige, influence with the British authorities, and a sound legal case.”   Rumors 66
of land-jobbing by New Yorkers, despite the disproval of the royal government, gave New 
Hampshire grantees hope for a future case.   Samuel Robinson dealt a further blow to the New 67
Yorkers when his Society for Propagating the Gospel petitioned the royal government.  He did so 







Hampshire Grants. This petition led to a royal order to cease new grants,  but on a long-term 68
basis, the struggle for New York claims in the territory remained strong. 
 Behind speculators like Duane was New York Governor George Clinton, who served 
from 1777-1795 and 1801-1804 as both royal governor and state governor.  He had a long career 
in early American politics and, in time, became Vice President under Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison.  Clinton biographer John P. Kaminski described Clinton as having “a blind spot 
when it came to Vermont,” never seeing “the parallel between Vermont’s struggle for 
independence and America’s.”   It remained Clinton’s view that Vermonters were traitors and 69
insurgents.   This perception of the Vermont question came to define the New York position on 70
the territory throughout the controversy.  Uncompromising and unwilling to capitulate, Clinton 
wrote that New York must “in no Instance . . . acknowledge the Authority of Vermont unless 
where there is no alternative left between Submission and inevitable Ruin.”   As early as 1779, 71
he expected to take the controversy to its bitter end, and he certainly did just that. 
 While New Yorkers had won lawsuits ejecting New Hampshire tenants, the settlers—led 
by Ethan and Ira Allen—refused to accept defeat.   The Allen siblings had land interests in the 72
region, but they also accepted the mantle of leadership of a burgeoning political and military 
movement.  The Green Mountain Boys, a “band of insurrectionists,” led by “bluster, swagger, 
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and oaths” formed a key part of this movement.   The group “made life so miserable for the few 73
persons who tried to settle on the basis of New York titles that [the settlers] soon abandoned the 
New Hampshire Grants.”   Before Ethan Allen’s election as commander of the Green Mountain 74
Boys, the Allens “apparently began to purchase Grants lands as early as 1762, always acquiring 
Wentworth titles rather than the more respectable but more expensive New York patents . . . and 
the Allens soon became the most prominent anti-New York activists and speculators on the 
Grants.”   The 65,000 acres of land held by Ira Allen’s Onion River Land Company was the 75
largest in the New Hampshire Grants, but as historian J. Kevin Graffagnino acknowledged, “the 
continued success . . . depended on keeping New York off the Grants.”   While their personal 76
interests were intertwined with the New Hampshire Grants, “the Allens and their followers, 
without mentioning their own speculative interests, were able to convince the settlers that New 
York with its quit rents, limited representation, and land jobbers was taking their sustenance from 
them.”   This growing anti-New York party pioneered the movement toward Vermont 77
independence and, in time, local conventions developed into the non-recognized state. 
 March 1775 marked the first explicit mention of potential Vermont independence, and the 
national Declaration of Independence of July 1776 meant that Vermonters looked to the new 
Congress for recognition rather than the British government.  Vermont held more conventions 
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throughout 1776, and independence became even more realistic when representatives from all 
across the state met.   Progress in these conventions was not because of the need to bring broad 78
representatives, as “the founders of Vermont had to create a state where no true community had 
existed.”   With a British siege of Fort Ticonderoga imminent in early 1777, attendance at the 79
various conventions decreased  as aid to the war effort from the New Hampshire Grants became 
essential.   The controversy to this point had been defined by land disputes, but with the national 80
declaration of independence, Allen’s independence effort became about the ideology of the 
American Revolution as much as it was about land interests.  
  While the Allens made an effort to bring the New Hampshire Grants together, factions 
also still existed within New York.  Outside of the Allens themselves, one of the key groups in 
the Grants was the College Party.  Centered around the northern part of the Connecticut River, 
close to Dartmouth College, the group “was willing to affiliate with any jurisdiction which 
would comply with its demand that the Connecticut River Valley be united.”   This group would 81
be a source of internal opposition throughout the controversy, and it often undermined Ethan 
Allen’s ability to act decisively.  Other groups on the outer edges of the Grants, in northern 
Gloucester County and southeastern Cumberland County, also prevented Vermont from 
achieving unanimity in favor of independence.    82
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 A divide existed between the frontier attitude in the New Hampshire Grants and the 
upper-class conservative attitudes of New York, and when New York’s new constitution showed 
that “the basic nature of its governing group was unchanged,” Vermonters became even more 
willing to make the break from New York.   In addition, congressional action of May 1776 83
encouraged supporters of Vermont independence by urging the formation of states, acting “for 
the people rather than as an agent of thirteen separate states.”   Congress here recommended that 84
any colony without an existing government should create an independent government which 
would “best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and America 
in general.”   The culmination of these events led to Vermont’s declaration of independence on 85
January 15, 1777 by a unanimous vote of a convention in Westminster, Vermont,  but some 86
residents of the Grants were still not on board.  Ultimately, once-opposing groups were unified 
by events in Albany.  An April 1777 New York state constitution that was “wholly unacceptable 
to the majority of the Grants inhabitants”  created unity and shifted momentum in favor of 87
Vermont. 
 While the convention was brief and left much unfinished, its decision to abandon the rule 
of both Britain and New York had a lasting impact.  The language of the declaration was strong 
and said that “an infringement on [residents of the New Hampshire Grants’] rights is still 
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meditated by the state of New-York.”   So the new state, called New Connecticut at the time, 88
had to prove its legitimacy.  As Onuf stated, moving into this new phase of creating an 
independent government, Vermont remained “hard pressed to convince the populace that it had a 
right to govern itself and that the constitution had any legal force.”   This problem would be the 89
first of many challenges to face an independent Vermont.  The first step to proving their own 
legitimacy—after changing their name to Vermont—was the creation of a state constitution.  As 
noted in the previous section, Maier and Wood each made note that Vermont’s effort toward 
crafting their constitution was influenced by other states, especially Pennsylvania.   According 90
to Taplin, “in almost every feature and particularly in making the legislature the dominant branch 
of government, the document was the antithesis of the New York constitution.”   Much as the 91
New York government prepared itself for constant opposition to the New Hampshire Grants, the 
new state government in Vermont prepared itself for constant opposition to New York.   
 Approved just six months after the national Declaration of Independence, Vermont’s 
declaration mentioned the national declaration and the reaction of the new Vermonters to the 
national declaration.   This reference made it clear that Vermont’s actions were tied to a larger 92
national movement.  As Taplin noted, “Vermont’s advance toward independence had not taken 
place in a vacuum . . . It had grown with the American surge for separation from the Crown and 
events elsewhere on the continent were often a direct impetus to action in Vermont.”   As the 93
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Continental Congress took up the issue, it remained to be seen whether the delegates to Congress 
would embrace these revolutionary ideas when handling the Vermont controversy.   
 It is important to note that these events unfolded in conjunction with numerous events 
across the new United States throughout the 1770s and 80s.  Many of these events took up 
significantly more time than the Vermont controversy and were influential on the institutional 
development taking place at the time.  New York delegate Gouverneur Morris described the 
schedule of Congress during the heat of war: “At present three Days in the Week are set apart for 
the Treasury and Finances, two more for the Consideration of foreign Affairs, add to this that 
Congress is also an executive Body.”   The problems continued even after the war, as Congress 94
was made to handle a growing national debt, taxation, commerce regulation, and other land 
disputes.  In addition to these issues, Wood also described an existential crisis among the 
Founders, because the revolution was “a utopian effort to reform the character of American 
society and to establish truly free governments, men in the 1780’s could actually believe that it 
was failing.”   The Vermont controversy was tied directly to both the policy-based and 95
existential issues of the Critical Period.  As historian Richard B. Bernstein noted in his 1987 Are 
We to Be a Nation?The Making of the Constitution, the controversy weakened the Confederation 
as delegates perceived that “problems affecting their own states were not treated with equal 
urgency by delegates from other states.”   Bernstein was clear that because “land was the most 96
durable and reliable measure of wealth and power in eighteenth-century America, both for 
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individuals and for the states,” land controversies were deeply intertwined with the most 
important issues in the Continental Congress.   Relying upon the letters of delegates to 97
Congress, the next chapter of the present study analyzes how Congress treated the issue of 
Vermont’s independence until their entry into the Union in 1791. 
4. “A Perpetual Broil”: The Continental Congress 
 The Continental Congress formed the battleground for debates which shaped the early 
course of United States government.  One debate occurred over the Vermont question.  While the 
question was by no means first on the minds of most delegates in comparison to the 
Revolutionary war or financial issues, it was unique in that it confronted the brand-new 
legislators in a brand-new nation with the challenge of determining the extent of their own 
jurisdiction.  The result was frustrating and unclear.  Yet the exercise of engaging in this debate 
offered insight on how delegates viewed their own power.  Mostly, they displayed a reluctance or 
even unwillingness to engage with the debate.  “I shod not much care if the Devil had them all,” 
wrote William Whipple in a 1777 letter which reflected the attitude of most delegates.   While 98
his impatience and annoyance was palpable in the earliest stages of the controversy, the 
controversy developed far beyond what any delegate imagined.  Through an analysis of the 
letters of delegates to congress from 1777 to 1788, the Vermont crisis may be understood as a 
key part of the development of how America’s legislators actually governed themselves.  This 
section makes such an analysis. 
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“A moot-point”: Early Action in Congress  
 In May 1776, the New Hampshire Grants presented their first petition to a reluctant 
committee of five in the Continental Congress.   This committee recommended cooperation 99
with New York, but said that “such submission ought not to prejudice the right of them or others 
to the lands in controversy,” hoping to avoid a conflict among rival colonies.   With the 100
recommendation as a key example, Taplin noted that “most delegates felt that the problem was 
best left alone in order to antagonize neither New York nor New England, and a precedent was 
thus established of avoiding the Vermont issue as much as possible.”   This first interaction was 101
typical of the early stages of the controversy in Congress.  This petition and New York’s 
remonstrance contributed to Vermont’s ability to declare their independence and create their own 
Constitution.   However reluctant Congress was to act to resolve the crisis, the revolutionary 102
spirit of the era promoted Vermont’s continued defiance. 
 Less than a year after the national Declaration of Independence, New York delegates 
moved to quell the same spirit among Vermonters “led by their Passions to bring on 
Revolutions.”   During an active military conflict, this point of view was not unreasonable for 103
the new state to take.  “Good Policy must therefore dictate to all the Necessity of discouraging 
this factious and turbulent Spirit, and of securing to every State its proper Rights and 
Jurisdiction, as well as against internal as foreign Enemies,” wrote the New York delegates.   104
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New York was eager to display strength and resolve to bring the question to a quick and 
favorable conclusion, but other delegates were less convinced that a final determination could be 
reached.  “I do not however think that New York has much to boast of,” wrote Massachusetts 
delegate James Lovell.  “It is still a moot-point whether the people of the Grants belong to 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, or New York.”   Despite New York’s desire for swift action, 105
Lovell’s view proved more common among the delegates as a whole.  
 Nevertheless, the New Yorkers persisted alone until 1778, when secession efforts in 
Western New Hampshire brought others states back into the fold.  New York Governor George 
Clinton drove the push for an answer on the Vermont question.   “I am exceedingly concerned 106
to learn that Congress have not yet taken up our Controversy . . . and that we are not of Course to 
speedily Expect an Explicit Declaration of the Sense of Congress on that Subject,” he wrote to 
the delegates.   Attempting to avoid the idea that any delay was their fault, the New York 107
delegates wrote back with a proposed resolution which was not discussed or passed.   108
However, Clinton placed midst of the blame on Congress as a whole.  He was often unsatisfied 
that Congress “was not able to afford a Moment to an Affair in which one of the States is so 
deeply Interested & the Honor & perhaps future Peace of the whole so intimately concerned.”   109
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New Yorkers often placed blame upon the “designing men” whose private interests allegedly got 
in the way.   At one point, Clinton wrote to President of Congress Henry Laurence that a 110
resolution was “necessary to prevent the immediate Shedding of Blood; and with out it I fear all 
those Calamities and misfortunes which are the natural attendants of a civil war.”   This 111
rhetoric was commonplace from New Yorkers, and Clinton’s letter suggested a desire to end the 
conflict before his nightmare scenario came to fruition. 
 Out of Clinton’s impatience came one casualty: the congressional career of Morris.  
Although he sought to be strategic in this early effort, his work was not well-received in New 
York.  Seeing weakness in the New York cause, he wrote that “the prejudices of the people are 
against us so are their interests” and suggested meeting some Vermont demands in order to keep 
them as a part of New York, espousing the philosophy that “A good government, a free one I 
mean, will always command the wealth of its people.”   According to Taplin, writing of Morris, 112
“the determination of Vermonters to establish independence impressed him and he doubted 
whether they could be diverted from it by force.”   His philosophy of good government was in 113
line with the thinking of other long-term nationalists such as New Yorker Alexander Hamilton 
and Virginian James Madison.  While it was ultimately correct, this attitude cost him his job as a 
delegate.  “I know I shall be charged by my Enemies,” he wrote to New Yorker Robert R. 
Livingston before being recalled.   At this moment in the crisis, interstate rivalries and personal 114
land interests overshadowed long-term thinking. 
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“The most virulent jealousy”: Rivalry with Eastern Delegates 
 Much as a “seaboard against backcountry” attitude served as a background to the conflict 
between the inhabitants of Vermont and their New York opponents, interstate conflict played a 
major role as the Vermont issue was debated in Congress.  This conflict was not out of the 
ordinary, as Peter Onuf noted that, at this time period, “pervasive mistrust crippled Congress, 
which therefore was unable to support and legitimize particular state claims or uphold the 
interests of the states collectively.”   At the center of this conflict was a rivalry between the 115
New England states and New York.   Letters from delegates indicate the existence of this 116
rivalry in the early stages of Congress.  “I can by no means think that this attempt to dismember 
our State will be countenanced by Congress,” wrote New York delegate William Duer to the 
New York Convention, “tho’ I am sorry to say, that I can very easily perceive that Individuals 
from the Eastern States mean to support Messrs. Allen in their extravagant Pretensions.”   117
According to Taplin, this perception was a part of the reason New York sought to utilize 
Congress as a means to bring their claims into the open and force a resolution of the issue.  118
 One of the early examples of conflict with New England was the congressional reaction 
to a letter from Dr. Thomas Young.  Young was a doctor in Philadelphia and an advisor to 
Vermont whose letter “so cogently presented the Vermont case that Congress was aroused to 
action.”   The letter intimated that Vermont need only comply with the May 10, 1776 119
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congressional resolution ordering state constitutions to be drafted in order to achieve 
statehood.   After its circulation, New York sought resolutions condemning Vermont, which 120
passed with some opposition from New England.   From the New York delegates’ perspective, 121
the New Englanders’ efforts were misguided as James Duane wrote that those states “drew on the 
merits of our Title, tho’ the Congress had only to do with the Exercise of Jurisdiction.”   While 122
Duane was correct in his statement that New England’s efforts to block the measures backfired, 
he did not anticipate the importance of the opposition of the New England delegates.  Samuel 
Adams wrote that the resolutions were meant to “gratify New York” over “A matter which is not 
worth your while to have explained to you.”   Clearly, the New England delegates had no 123
interest in settling New York’s disputes.  Roger Sherman of Connecticut offered especially sharp 
criticism of the resolutions, precipitating early tensions  and showing New York’s support to be 124
thinner than its delegates perceived.  Yet these early resolutions and division were just the 
beginning; during real crises, the debate in Congress proved even more remarkable.   
“Into the Snare”: The Western Towns Secede 
 While New York delegates had seen their cause lose its significance in Congress, a new 
development along the Connecticut River served as a blow to the Vermonters’ cause and 
bolstered a coalition in Congress around New York.  In the summer of 1778, sixteen western 
New Hampshire towns, led by the College Party, voted by slim majorities to secede and join 
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Vermont.  Vermont’s legislature approved the addition on June 11, 1778.   “The Hampshire 125
Grants by Receiving & Countenancing them, have fell into the Snare laid for them by New 
York,” wrote New Hampshire delegate Josiah Bartlett.   While the College Party did not expect 126
pushback, New Hampshire Governor Meshech Weare received concerns from those in the towns 
who still remained loyal to New Hampshire and fought the move.   Weare wrote that he was 127
willing to settle the issue by violent means, saying that “very possib[ly] the sword will decide 
it.”   This threat forced the issue to come before the Continental Congress, where the Vermont 128
cause suffered.   
 Bartlett wrote to Weare in September of 1778 with details on the reaction of other 
delegates, although the issue had not yet come before Congress officially.  “Those Delegates to 
whom I have Communicated the affair,” he wrote, “Seem surprised at the ungenerous and 
impolite Conduct of Vermont, and I have reason to Believe they will find few or none in 
Congress that will Justify their Conduct or Espouse their Cause.”   Bartlett was correct in his 129
forecast of congressional reaction to the secession of the sixteen towns; however, a proper course 
of action remained in question for the delegates.  Within a few weeks Bartlett informed Weare 
that “Every person who Spoke on the Subject Severely Condemned the Conduct of the Revolted 
Towns & of Vermont; What was proper to be done was all the difficulty.”   This inability to 130
decide on a proper reaction was common  in Congress, and Bartlett pointed to a general desire to 
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put off the issue as long as possible.  “I believe it is the Desire of the major party of the members 
of Congress (if possible) to keep off the final Decision of the old Dispute Concerning the New 
Hampshire Grants to Some future time when it may be Setled without any Danger to the 
Common Cause,” he wrote.   While this statement can be directed at congressional handling of 131
the Vermont question throughout the controversy, it was the first complaint by a non-New Yorker 
about the pace of action on the issue in Congress.  Ethan Allen promised to take the issue back to 
Vermont and encouraged Bartlett to delay congressional action until the Vermont legislature 
could meet to rescind the offer of union with the towns.   
 Eventually, even Vermont ally and Connecticut delegate Richard Sherman became 
involved in the push to end the “dangerous and alarming”  efforts to join Vermont, and he 132
confirmed that it hurt the overall cause of Vermont in a letter to Elisha Payne, a judge and leader 
of the towns.  A true republican of the late eighteenth century, Sherman expressed faith that the 
constitution of each state could be amended by the will of the people, calling secession 
unnecessary.  He wrote that “for people Inhabiting within the known & acknowleged boundaries 
of any of the united States to Separate without the consent of the State to which they belong, 
appears to me a very unjustifiable violation of the Social compact, and pregnant with the most 
ruinous consequences . . . it appears to me indispensibly necessary that civil Government Should 
 Ibid., 693-695.131
 Roger Sherman to Elisha Payne, October 31, 1778, LDC 11: 152.  As was characteristic of 132
New England delegates, Sherman was mostly non-committal on the issue, but was possibly 
friendly to the Vermont cause.  “Whether the State of New Hampshire or New York have a right 
of Jurisdiction over the New Hampshire Grants on the west Side of Connecticut River, or 
whether by the neglect of the former to Claim and Support its Jurisdiction against the latter, the 
people have a right to form themselves into a distinct State, I shall not give any opinion, those 
questions will I Suppose at a proper time be judicially decided.”
Abrahamson !33
be vigorously Supported.”   The argument on state jurisdiction over the New Hampshire Grants 133
was reasonable, but secession worried Sherman and other delegates to Congress.  Even Vermont 
allies were fearful of the precedent set by congressional approval of secession.  In autumn of 
1778, Allen and Bennington denounced the actions of the sixteen towns.   
 Despite this denunciation, New York sought to take advantage of dissent within Vermont, 
as not all leaders agreed with Allen’s announcement.  According to a letter from New York 
delegates to George Clinton in early December 1778, John Wheelock, a prominent leader in the 
sixteen towns, was “complaining that Allen had no authority to make the before mentioned 
Declaration; that they utterly renounced it and adherd to their Revolt from New Hampshire.”   134
This crack in the unity of Vermont leadership was a positive sign for New Yorkers, who thought 
that the dispute “renders ridiculous the Plan which Allen and his adherents boasted of as 
decisive.”   As confident as ever that the controversy would be settled by Congress, New York 135
placed delegate John Jay in charge of the effort to resolve the issue.   Jay was soon forced to 136
delay his work because the Congress elected him to the Chair, and he wrote to Clinton that “the 
season for bringing on the affair of Vermont is not yet arrived,” but assured him that his 
“Endeavors shall not be wanting to bring it to a Termination satisfactory to NewYork.”  137
 While New York delegates prepared themselves to do battle in Congress, New Hampshire 
delegates were not in harmony with New York’s perspective.  New Hampshire delegates feared 
capitulating to the interests of New York delegates.  In that regard they shared a cause with the 
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Vermonters and were willing to accept Allen’s desire to solve the secession issue.  This wariness 
towards New York’s dominance led Whipple to write Weare his thought that “nothing will 
effectively settle the dispute but New Hampshires opposing her claim to that of New-York; even 
if she should afterwords (supposing the decision to be in favor of New Hampshire) agree that the 
grant on the west side of the River should be a separate State.”   In the context of a struggle for 138
dominance between New York and New England, this statement made sense.  Whipple endorsed 
this method because, he wrote, “in that case New Hampshire would have it in her power to settle 
the line to her satisfaction, and perhaps avoid some disagreable disputes that may otherwise 
arise.”   Whipple later recommended that a lawyer be hired to compete with Jay, so that New 139
Hampshire would not be left out in the ensuing debate.    140
 As the issue became more prominent, delegates in Congress saw three possible 
conclusions to the question: New York earning jurisdiction, New Hampshire earning jurisdiction, 
or a separate state being formed.  Whipple thought the first possibility to be the most unfavorable 
because of Vermonters’ presumably negative reaction to being “compeled to Unite with a people 
for whom they have an inextinguishable aversion, arising from injuries they have suffered, by the 
most cruel acts of Injustice.”   He also thought that congressional sanction of a separate state 141
would only exacerbate the secession cries of western New Hampshire and thus thought that 
“every one who has the Happiness of Mankind, & Peace & Welfare, of New-Hampshire at Heart 
will be convinced of the propriety of her claiming the jurisdiction . . . I have reason to think 
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Congress will be hard pressed to do something in the matter.”   In the end, Congress took no 142
decisive action as a result of the secession of the New Hampshire towns; however, it led to 
further study of the issue in Congress.  In addition, the controversy forced delegates to reveal 
their true thoughts on the matter and demonstrated the divide between New York and New 
Hampshire delegates.   
“Our whole Strength”: New York’s Resolutions 
 Revitalized by the secession issue, New York entered 1779 expecting Congress to decide 
the matter once and for all.  “I wish to appear with our whole Strength,” wrote Jay to Clinton.   143
The usual delays remained for delegates, however.  According to New York delegate William 
Floyd, Congress put off early action “while the grand business of Finance was under 
consideration,”  but Congress did consider resolutions which Jay called “temperate & founded 144
on plain Principles.”   While New York delegates were hopeful about the resolutions,  Jay’s 145 146
notes on the debates over them indicated hesitancy toward a firm decision on the part of some 
delegates.  A key concern in these debates was whether Congress—because the Articles of 
Confederation were not complete—had the power to decide jurisdictional questions.   Onuf, in 147
The Origins of the Federal Republic, wrote that before the Articles, “Congress had no 
constitutional standing at all”; however, “Congress also accumulated powers in an ad hoc 
fashion, as it responded to contingencies.”   Jurisdictional decision-making was not a power 148
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Congress was prepared to accumulate, and although it was not as strong an action as New York 
sought, Congress decided to send a committee to Vermont “to enquire into the Reasons why they 
refuse to continue Citizens of the Respective States which heretofore exercised Jurisdiction over 
that district and to take away prudent measure to promote an amicable Settlement of all 
differences, and prevent divisions and Animosities so prejudicial to the United States.”   This 149
moderation proved beneficial to New York, as it seemed too reasonable for any member to vote 
against.   However, Duane noted that placing so much stake in New England delegates was 150
“not a desirable Hazard,”  and Massachusetts delegate James Lovell reported that Clinton was 151
unhappy with the measure, despite his state’s delegates supporting it.    152
 Clinton’s concern was unfounded as the committee reported that the Vermonters “were 
heartily willing on Condition that Time was given them & due Notice to represent their Case, to 
Submit themselves & finally to abide by the decision of the United States in Congress 
assembled.”   Lovell noted that the issue remained “delicate,” as Vermonters “expect to be 153
heard regularly before any formal Decision is made concerning them,” yet their recognition as a 
legitimate party could “‘wound the Feelings’” of New York.   The return of the committee from 154
Vermont also troubled New Hampshire delegates, who knew that if New Hampshire did not 
make a claim to Vermont, it would “assuredly be annex’d to N.Y. which I am sure must be 
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attended with disagreeable consequences not only to N.H. but other Eastern States.”   They had 155
earlier pleaded for a representative from the state to handle the matter exclusively.   Jay saw 156
that both New York and New Hampshire needed to agree to allow Congress to settle the 
boundary and “by act of Legislature [empower Congress] to adjust the disputes with the people 
of the grants on equitable and liberal principles,” realizing that congressional jurisdiction was 
“the great point.”   He hoped this could settle the issue of the limits of congressional power to 157
handle jurisdictional matters.  Before the final resolutions passed, Jay became frustrated enough 
to suggest that New York tax revenue be withheld from Congress until action was taken, even 
though he acknowledged it would break from his desire to promote the common interest.  “I 
would nevertheless detain every shilling of it till justice be done the State,” wrote Jay, “and for 
this purpose Congress should be immediately authorized by law to do it effectually, 
unembarrassed by useless and perplexing provisoes and reservations.”   In late September 158
1779, New York earned an apparent victory when Congress passed resolutions about the 
controversy which laid out a path for a final decision.  159
 At the heart of the resolutions was the desire to tie the Vermont controversy to the 
reasonable maintenance and security of state rights, which Congress saw as “one of the great 
objects of the Union of the United States of America.”   The key provisions of the resolution 160
asked the involved states to pass legislation which would allow Congress to settle the 
 William Whipple to Josiah Bartlett, August 3, 1779, LDC 13: 322.155
 William Whipple to Josiah Bartlett, June 4, 1779, LDC 13: 24.156
 John Jay to George Clinton, August 27, 1779, LDC 13: 419.157
 John Jay to George Clinton, September 2, 1779, LDC 13: 446. 158
 Samuel Bolten’s Diary, September 23-24, 1779, LDC 13: 538.159
 Ibid., 552.160
Abrahamson !38
jurisdictional claims, and also forbade the involved states from voting on the final decision.   161
The resolution was not without teeth as it promised to enforce provisions disallowing any party 
from granting unclaimed lands.   Soon after their passage, Jay wrote a detailed letter to Clinton 162
with the resolution and his comments included.  Knowing Clinton would not be completely 
satisfied by the resolutions, he noted that “it would not have been difficult to have obtained what 
some among us would call very spirited and pointed Resolutions, but wh in my opinion would 
have been very imprudent ones, because among other Reasons they wd. not have been 
unanimous.”    The resolution made some concessions including the acknowledgment of an 163
equal footing among the parties, but the resolutions gave New York the opportunity for the final 
decision they long desired.   
“Hangs by the Eyelids”: Enforcement Delayed 
 As was the norm, New York sought swift action on the new proposals.  Jay thought that 
the resolutions would “establish perpetual Harmony” between the states, but hoped that the 
parties would not argue “about Triffles, or by unnecessary heats retard a Settlement satisfactory 
to all.”   Jay made this statement as the leader of a delegation confident that the tides were 164
turning in New York’s direction; however, what were “Triffles” to Jay were far more serious 
issues to other delegates.  Lovell noted that while Massachusetts felt obliged to act under the 
circumstances, he himself hoped that his “State will never let Congress be a Tribunal to decide 
Bounds & Right of Soil . . . I think we have got so far [in the resolutions] without committing 
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Enormities, in that Case.”   Massachusetts delegates noted to the Massachusetts Council that 165
the pending Articles of Confederation offered better means to act on the matter, although their 
anti-New York bias must be noted.   In addition, some delegates who admired Vermont’s 166
revolutionary cause frowned upon New York’s attitude toward Vermont.  New Jersey delegate 
wrote that “they talk of the Vermont-people as Great-Britain does of us . . . It is a childish Idea 
that a Majority in any Country . . . should be governed by a Minority.”   Like many delegates, 167
he saw any attempt to force Vermonters to submit to New York as a path to violence, although he 
approved the terms of the resolution.  “I will remember what I thought some years ago,” he 
wrote, “that if I were oppressed by a Set of Land-jobbers and Aristocratical Gentry as those 
People were, I would die in the last Ditch rather than succumb to it.”   He expressed sympathy 168
for the Vermonters in their struggle against New York.  These thoughts were by no means the 
norm, but New York’s path to a decision was not as clear-cut as they would have enjoyed. 
 Jay took the liberty to send each involved state an identical resolution to pass, “lest 
variances which might be deemed important, should create Delay & Dispute,”  but New 169
Hampshire and Massachusetts were more concerned with their own revived interests in the 
territory.  While New Hampshire saw the potential for a gain in political and financial power 
from being given Vermont, they also saw the likelihood of it becoming a part of New York if 
they did not fight hard for the territory.   This fear was of much concern to New Hampshire 170
 James Lovell to Samuel Adams, September 29, 1779, LDC 13: 595-96.165
 to the Massachusetts Council, October 4, 1779, LDC 14: 20-21.166
 William Churchill Houston to Robert Morris, March 6, 1780, LDC 14: 468.167
 Ibid., 468.168
 Jon Jay to George Clinton, October 7, 1779, LDC 14: 29.169
 Woodbury Langdon to Meshech Weare, October 12, 1779, LDC 14: 58.170
Abrahamson !40
delegates.  “It . . . becomes Necessary for the State of N. Hampr. to Exert every Nerve to prevent 
a State by her vast Extent of Territory, and Still Greater Claims, already Troublesome to her 
Neighbors and Tyranical to the last degree over all such as are unhappy victims of their 
resentment—from Extending Jurisdiction as to Circumvolve the State of New Hampr,” wrote 
New Hampshire delegate Nathaniel Peabody of the resolution he considered to be “hatched up 
by N.Y.”    171
 Early into 1780, new New York delegate Ezra L’Hommedieu wrote to Clinton that some 
delegates “have received information from the New Hampshire Grants [that] they are determined 
not to submit to the Decision [of Con]gress, their Claim to Independence; but have [named] 
Agents to send to Congress, with offers to confederate with the United States, or such of them as 
are willing to confederate with Vermont.”   Lovell confirmed that delegates had arrived to 172
make an offer to join the Union, but did not submit to the main question of the September 1779 
resolutions; hearings on the 1779 resolution were thus delayed even longer.   On March 2, 173
Congress agreed to take the matter under consideration with all parties,  but were forced to 174
postpone as nine states were not in attendance.   In April, New York delegate Philip Schuyler 175
wrote to Clinton that “the Vermont business still hangs by the Eyelids” because Maryland and 
Delaware did not have representatives present so a vote could not be taken.   New York was 176
frustrated by the apparent lack of motivation to prevent what they viewed as “a usurpation which 
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both in its principles and its consequences has the most dangerous and alarming Tendency.”   177
However, other delegates were far from alarmed by the issue and saw many more pressing issues 
on their docket.  Maryland delegate Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer wrote that he hoped that 
“Congress have more wisdom then to take final Order in this business, before our independence 
is established; We have business enough on our hands without carving out more of this time.”   178
In this spirit, the delegates postponed the issue until the second Tuesday in September, although 
New York tried to get an earlier date.   New Hampshire contributed to this delay as well 179
because their delegate was not present,  and disappointed New York delegates wrote that “to 180
have pushed it with too much warmth would have answered no other purpose that expose us to 
the censure of wishing to take advantage of our antagonists.”   However, it appears that New 181
York delegates had pushed too hard as numerous delegates wrote expressing some annoyance 
with the loss of focus on other issues in Congress.   182
 New York’s fear of failure continued to grow as it had been over a year since the 
September 1779 resolutions had passed and no action had been taken.  John Morin Scott wrote “I 
am of Opinion the sooner we press the Matter to its Crisis the better, For I fear the Interest agt. us 
is growing.  Not that I imagine a Majority will expressly decide agt. Us, but that it may 
eventually be done by procrastination.”   Debate finally began, but Duane was quickly 183
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convinced that the delegates “were disposed to support the Independence of our revolted Citizens 
. . . But the Acts of our Antagonists & the shameful prostitution of the disputed lands to gain 
party in some of the States have in my Judgement no inconsiderable weight”; therefore, he saw 
the need for New York to act on its own to manage the situation.   Other delegates saw New 184
York’s dissatisfaction with the recent debate, and Rhode Island delegate Ezekiel Cornell wrote 
that “the gentlemen from New York did not like very well the sentiments of a Majority of 
members on the subject and will lett the affair rest until a change in members shall take place 
that will better suit their purpose,”  and New Hampshire John Sullivan noted that the New 185
Yorkers “have never mentioned it since & it rests at present.”   With the situation unfavorable, 186
New York delegates were not present and New Hampshire delegate Samuel Livermore wrote that 
he was “very strongly impressed with an idea that this dispute will never be settled but by 
dividing the territory between N York & us,” but knew that any outcome would be difficult to 
implement to the satisfaction of all parties.   With the controversy at a seeming standstill, and 187
New York delegates momentarily out of the picture, a spark came to re-ignite the situation: a 
letter from British Secretary of State Lord George Germain. 
“Traytors to their Country”: Expediency Acts 
 The shocking revelation in the summer of 1781 brought the Vermont question back onto 
the top of the docket of Congress.  In a letter to General George Washington, Delaware delegate 
Thomas McKean quoted an intercepted letter from Germain to British General Sir Henry Clinton 
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which read that “the return of the people of Vermont to their allegiance is an event of the Utmost 
importance to the Kings Affairs and at this time if the French and Washington really mediate an 
irruption into Canada may be considered as opposing an insurmountable bar to the attempt.”   188
Delegates reacted to the news and sought to handle the issue with a new sense of urgency.  
Sullivan wrote that he was “astonished at the proceedings of Vermont . . . I suppose whatever can 
be done here will be done in a week or fortnight at farthest.”   According to Taplin, Vermont’s 189
talks with Britain were not done with the end of joining Britain, but that “Vermont was playing a 
game of expediency and that any desire it had to desert the American cause arose not from love 
of England but from the fears that Congress would not accept its terms for in dependence and 
would be unsuccessful in the war.”   To a certain extent, the plan worked for Vermont, as 190
evidenced by the statements of delegates at the time.  St. Thomas Jenifer wrote at the time that 
“if we do not speedily allow them to be independant I fear they will join the Enemy.”   Events 191
in New York and Massachusetts also conspired against New York’s cause.  Massachusetts passed 
a law which stated that they would give up their claim to the territory in favor of independence 
and the New York legislature’s lower chamber also voted in favor of granting independence.   192
 The discovery of potential British involvement rendered the 1779 resolutions on Vermont 
impotent, and Congress adopted a different path.  A committee of Congress submitted a 
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recommendation that Vermont be granted independence—so long as they go back to their 
original claimed boundaries west of the Connecticut River and east of Lake Champlain.   New 193
York’s delegates arrived late to the debate and found the controversy “in a manner Settled” upon 
the committee recommendation.   In a memorial to Congress, the delegates reminded Congress 194
of the 1779 resolutions and expressed a continued desire to follow procedure laid out within 
them despite the fact that other parties had not followed them.   While their statements were 195
bold and unpersuasive to other delegates, New York delegates challenged the other delegates to 
consider the implications of creating a new state out of an old one before voting, writing that 
“they can place their Principles on some Ground, and oppose Expediency and publick Safety to 
Justice and Right.”   To them, the justice of preventing the new state was more important than 196
expediency.  Nevertheless, Congress appointed a committee to meet with Vermonters to discuss 
potential terms of independence, to be led by Vermont ally Roger Sherman of Connecticut.   As 197
congressional leaders pressured Clinton to support the resolution,  his delegates wrote him with 198
full expectations of a “Sacrifice of Jurisdiction,” and could only hope to guarantee as much 
territory as possible.   199
 Much like New York’s delegates, New Hampshire delegates became disheartened by the 
resolution of Congress.  Echoing New York’s arguments got them nowhere in the overall 
process, and they saw the door slowly closing on the New Hampshire Grants as a whole.  Their 
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concern became limiting Vermont to the west side of the Connecticut River.   Livermore wrote 200
to Weare that if only this limit could be established and Grafton county made part of New 
Hampshire, they “might be a happy state.”   A committee of Vermonters made up of Ira Allen, 201
Jonas Fay, and Bezaleel Woodward met with Congress in mid-August and answered questions in 
agreement with the wishes of Congress.   Vermont hoped to join the confederacy before settling 202
any specific boundaries using the process laid out by the Articles of Confederation.  This 
proposal went beyond Cogress’s offer for independence.  Eventually, the Vermonters returned 
home to seek a final answer.   The tide had turned against New York, as even the often-friendly 203
Southern states voted for the resolutions due to their recent invasion by the British Army, 
although they would vote to ask New York to relinquish willingly, given their view “that 
Congress has no authority to admit those people into the Federal Union as a separate State on the 
present principles.”   Despite the confidence of Congress that Vermont would soon be the 204
fourteenth state, no official word had been heard from Vermont’s representatives by the 
beginning of 1782. 
“It Appears Very strange”: Vermont’s Rejection  
 By the end of January 1782, it became clear to the delegates in Congress that Vermont 
would not accept the potential offer for independence.  Delegates had little idea why this 
rejection would have taken place, and Connecticut delegates wrote that “It Appears Very strange 
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that this People will not now Accept of what they have for a long Time been endeavouring.”   205
Vermont’s leaders had decided that conceding to the congressional suggestion would reduce their 
leverage in the situation and refused to begin any other discussion until given entry into the 
confederation.   The rejection was a setback for congressional favor toward Vermont 206
independence; however, it began the final stages of the debate in Congress over the issue.  As 
Livermore wrote, “Congress are much divided and cannot agree to any one thing.”   Options as 207
diverse as military action and further reconciliation were on the table, but no agreement could be 
found, as the controversy had reached uncharted territory of congressional involvement.   New 208
York delegates were taken aback by the situation and could not understand how Vermont kept 
some friends in Congress despite the fact that “their Conduct was Directly against the United 
States and in favor of our Enemies.”   The fact that Vermont considered working with England 209
was shocking to New York.  On the other hand, New Hampshire delegates pondered the idea of 
an even split of Vermont between themselves and New York, but did not know whether Congress 
could agree to any action at all.   “Some members of Congress are much alarmed & all are 210
embarrassed at the present situation of Vermont,” wrote Livermore, “but they have such 
repugnant ideas & interests or rather Attachments, as render it very difficult, if not impossible, to 
bring them to agree to any one thing.”   It was clear from letters that delegates were unhappy 211
with the situation that existed after Vermont’s January 1782 rejection.  New England delegates 
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made an attempt to vote for independence, but only six states voted in favor.   Congress was 212
divided on the best course of action, and the Vermont controversy had once again proven too 
difficult, if not impossible, to solve for Congress.  As usual, Congress pushed a final decision to 
a later date. 
“A Theme fruitful of Reflection”: Institutional Thought 
 The context of war against Great Britain and the struggle for power between the new 
states weighed most heavily on the delegates’ minds during the Vermont controversy, but a select 
few—especially the delegates farthest from the conflict—sought the consideration of the broader 
institutional implications of congressional action in the dispute.  The bulk of the interest in the 
Vermont dispute from less-involved delegates came during moments of crisis, evident especially 
in the 1781 resolves.  Those conversations revolved mostly around the war effort, not 
congressional power.  Although it had been going on in the background for the duration of the 
controversy, Vermont’s rejection of Congress’s offer for independence brought other delegates 
into the discussion over the institutional implications of settlement.  In the vote for independence 
of March 1782, numerous states voted against Vermont “on supposition of the want of authority 
in Congress so to declare them.”   The difference of opinion which arose from the rejection 213
divided Congress over the best course of action.  “In this delicate crisis the interposition of 
Congress is again called for, & indeed seems to be indispensable; but whether in the way of 
military coercion, or a renewal of former overtures, or by making the first a condition of the last, 
is not so unanimously decided,” wrote Madison of a Congress concerned over setting a bad 
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precedent.   Given his view of Congress at a standstill, Madison summarized the deeper, 214
institutional conflict: “Nothing is more distressing to those who have a due respect for the 
constitutional modifications of power than to be obliged to decide on them.”    215
 New York and New Hampshire delegates brought up the same concerns over the right of 
Congress to decide in favor of Vermont and rejecting the residents of Vermont claiming the 
ability to separate from existing states.  However, their rhetoric was tied to their overall interests 
in property claims and a desire for independence in the disputed territory.  These thoughts existed 
before 1782, and North Carolina delegate Thomas Burke was one of the first to express concern 
over the controversy in Congress.  Writing to North Carolina Governor Richard Caswell in 1777 
about the introduction of the controversy, he hoped that Congress “will be wise enough to 
decline any interposition.  I am for my own part clearly against assuming a Judiciary power.”   216
His wish came true until the 1781 offer of independence when Congress decided to make a final 
decision.   
 The institutional development of the Articles of Confederation provided the roots of the 
political debate over the Vermont controversy.  The states ratified the Articles and they took 
effect in March 1781 before the bulk of congressional debate on Vermont.  Specifically, Article 
IX of the Articles contained sections relevant to the debate before Congress.  “The united states 
in congress assembled shall also be the last resort in appeal in all disputes and and differences 
now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, 
jurisdiction or any other cause whatever,” read the article, followed by a procedure for 
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adjudication of these matters.   Delegates agreed that the Articles governed the situation; 217
however, the dispute over Vermont did not fit squarely into one interpretation of the Articles.  
Certainly territory and boundary issues existed between the recognized states New York, New 
Hampshire, and (depending on their mood) Massachusetts.  Conflicting land grants were also at 
stake in the controversy.  However, the non-sanctioned Vermont also claimed both territory and 
grants of land; so, accepting the reality of the situation, Congress had to be careful to include 
them without explicit recognition.  In a later debate over how to react to an action by Vermont, 
Madison acknowledged that bringing their leaders in for a trial would “be a stronger recognition 
go its independence than Congress had made or meant to make.”   Placed in this situation, the 218
context forced Congress to define the limits of its power to define states. 
 A leader in bringing about the institutional questions early on, Madison espoused a 
framework for Article IX of the yet-to-be-ratified Articles in 1780, according to Duane’s notes.  
In debate, he stated that “if the District in Question was comprehended within the Jurisdiction of 
one or more of the United States, it must necessarily follow, that the Inhabitants could have no 
Right to set up an independent State . . . it had been clearly proved to lie within New York or 
New Hampshire: for as these States were bounded upon each other there could be no Room 
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between them for another Jurisdiction.”   Yet, was Vermont’s situation unique enough to be 219
exempt from the strict guidelines laid down by Madison?  Georgia delegate Richard Howly said 
yes, arguing that Vermont had existed as a unit—opposed to New York rule—before the dispute 
reached Congress.  He said that “the King of Great Britain had no power without their own 
Consent to annex them to New York. . . they had a Right to become Independent on the same 
principles which had Authorized these States to shake off the British Yoke.”   Comparisons of 220
New York to Britain were bold and uncommon; yet, some delegates did make similar statements 
to show support for Vermont and oppose the strict reading of Article IX.  
 Soon after Congress attempted to allow Vermont independence in 1781, New Jersey 
delegate Elias Boudinot wrote of Vermont’s argument for independent existence before the 
revolution.  Crediting popular sovereignty, he quoted the Vermont agents as saying that “at the 
Revolution they were in a State of Nature—That they then set up a new Government and have 
ever since been in the actual Possession of Sovereign Power.”   This argument was not without 221
pitfalls, as Boudinot himself pointed out the next year.  He raised an important question: “Can 
Congress as sovereign Guardians of the United States, when they conceive the general Safety of 
the common Cause shall require it, recieve into the Union as a separate State, any Territory & 
People in the actual Possession of Sovereignty & Independence de facto, without examining into 
& determining the Right & Title of such People de Jure?”   A South Carolina delegate 222
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preoccupied with the institutional implications of the Vermont issue, Arthur Middleton, said that 
it could not look only to de facto sovereignty or decide to create new states from within current 
states at all “because it will be a precedent for future Divisions of the larger States—but above all 
because Congress have no power to grant such admission, & the only ground hitherto pleaded for 
the measure has been of policy & not of Right.”   Delegates would vacillate on the questions of 223
de facto sovereignty and state admission throughout the rest of the Congress.  While political 
interests played a key role in that debate, these questions solidified the divide between the ardent 
supporters of each side.  The first instance of this debate came upon the surprising news that 
Vermont withdrew their rejection of the 1781 resolves. 
“Admitting so many Serpents”: A Second Consideration 
 According to a March 1782 letter from New Hampshire delegate Samuel Livermore, a 
rumor that Vermont had changed their minds and agreed to follow the 1781 resolutions arose in 
Congress.   Hoping that the “hurly burly” was done, Livermore was privately willing “to give 224
them independence, & receive them into confederation, if that would end our troubles upon the 
subject,” yet the vote was seven in favor and five opposed, not enough to gain approval.   New 225
York delegates saw this reconsideration in the exact opposite light, again questioning the 
Vermonter’s loyalty to the United States.  “Whereas every disinterested person must clearly see 
that by establishing the Independence of the Grants & admitting them into the Union, the 
Influence of their wicked Leaders will be rendered permanent, and endanger the Safety of these 
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united States, by admitting so many Serpents into our Bosom to poison our Councils, divulge our 
Secrets and give an easy Admission to the Enemy into the Heart of the American Empire,” they 
wrote to Clinton, adding that “nothing but their Inability to increase their Number to nine States, 
can prevent the Execution of the dangerous plan & arbitrary dismemberment of our unhappy 
State.”   That a second chance for Vermont might be considered brought New York’s leaders to 226
the height of their frustrations, and all forces that worked against them recommended delay on 
the issue. 
 In an effort to undermine a new committee made up entirely of Vermont supporters, New 
York delegate John Morin Scott sought to enter Governor Chittenden’s initial rejection of the 
1781 resolutions into the record.  This action would have bolstered their argument that the 1781 
independence offer was void.  However, this effort failed and Scott wrote that it was “evidently 
the fixed and settled purpose of the Majority to sacrifice its Rights on the Alter of the 
Independence of Vermont.”   In addition, southern states remained concerned about the future 227
of the confederacy if a regional balance was thrown off.  In April 1782, Arthur Lee of Virginia 
wrote to Samuel Adams of his feeling that “with the admission of this little State the 
confederation will end; its present inequality being as much as it can bear.”   The reason delay 228
was possible had little to do with support for Vermont’s cause, however.  In addition to the land 
promises allegedly made by Vermont to supportive delegates,  the larger debate over western 229
lands forced itself into the Vermont controversy.  “The true secret is that the Vote of Vermont is 
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wished for as an auxiliary agt. the Western claims of Virga. . . Some of the E. States which are 
anxious for the admission of Vermont see this and impede the adjustment of Western boundaries 
on the ground of the Cessions,” wrote Madison.   According to Madison, Pennsylvania only 230
supported Vermont because of the western lands issue; if this issue was resolved, Vermont would 
be denied independence.   In the fall of 1782 Vermont once again precipitated a situation in 231
which Congress was forced to act against them. 
“A fair way to ruin themselves”: Controversy in Cumberland County 
 In September 1782, a dispute between the competing civil governments of Vermont and 
New York in Cumberland County led to a small-scale military operation led by Ethan Allen, 
which, in turn, resulted in swift action by George Clinton and his delegates in Congress.   “This 232
New and unexpected Violence . . . will we trust induce Congress immediately to interpose and 
exert their Authority for the Releif, and Protection of those unhappy People, our Fellow Citizens, 
now made Prisoners by a lawless Power,” wrote the delegates to Clinton, promising to get 
Congress to enforce the 1779 resolutions.   A recommendation on the issue was delayed by the 233
committee, concerning New York delegates.   According to Samuel Osgood of Massachusetts, 234
the New Yorkers pressed for a decision, but a victory for either side was unlikely.   One of 235
Vermont’s few allies, Rhode Island tried legislative maneuvering, but their efforts to confirm 
independence under the 1781 resolution failed to achieve the necessary seven votes.   The 236
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combination of the Cumberland County violence and a New York compromise on western lands 
made Vermont independence look as unlikely as it ever had.  Madison wrote that “Duane seems 
not unapprized of the advantage which New York has gained and is already takeing measures for 
a speedy vote on that question . . . she has acquired with Congress the merit of liberality rendered 
the title to her reservation more respectable and at least dampt the zeal with which Vermont has 
been abetted.”   According to Rhode Island delegate David Howell, Vermont independence was 237
met “with every opposition you can imagine.”    238
 In November, the committee made its report on the Cumberland County situation.  
However, it proved weak, confirming the New York delegation’s worst concerns about action in 
favor of New York.   New York still faced serious opposition within Congress, as delegates 239
believed the New York delegates created the Cumberland County issue when they decided to 
send commissioners into an area the Vermont government sought to control.   To New York, 240
these statements “served to shew a clear alteration of Sentiment, with respect to Vermont . . .” 
and led delegates to believe no action would come from Congress.   Even a report of spying in 241
Vermont had few results, as many thought having a trial for its leaders would “be a stronger 
recognition of its independence than Congress had made or meant to make.”   Eventually, 242
Congress passed resolutions condemning Vermont’s actions in Cumberland County, but delegates 
entertained no hope that they would be enforced, writing that the only benefit to them was that 
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they gave “a complexion to the future deliberations on the subject and may induce Congress the 
more readily to adopt some moderate medium.”   These resolutions constituted the beginning 243
of the anti-climactic ending of the Vermont controversy in Congress. 
“A body so mutable”: Indecision in Congress 
 During the Revolutionary War, delegates often stated that they would have more time for 
issues such as the Vermont controversy once the business of war was over.  Yet, once the war 
ended in 1781, they turned their attention to the business of nation-building, and the Vermont 
controversy earned even less attention.  Added into the mix was nationalist-minded Alexander 
Hamilton, who was the new delegate for New York.  “I have little hope that we shall ever be able 
to engage Congress to act with decision upon the matter or that our State will ever recover any 
part of the revolted territory but upon a plan that will interest the two States I have mentioned, or 
at least one of them,” he wrote to Clinton.   A plan to work with New Hampshire garnered 244
some attention, but he wrote that “It is a business in which nobody cares to act with decision.”   245
The final act of the controversy was not without some drama, however, as Chittenden responded 
to the recent Cumberland County resolutions with an angry 22-page letter railing against 
congressional interference in the internal affairs of Vermont.   New Hampshire delegate 246
Phillips White noted that Chittenden no longer had any qualms with open dispute with the 
United States even though he still wanted to remain a part of it.   Reflecting the mood of the 247
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Congress has a whole, he wondered aloud whether the committee appointed to respond to the 
letter “may procure some new resolution that will never be Carried into execution.”  248
 New York delegates did make one last ditch effort to claim Vermont, but never acted 
upon the threat.  In 1784, the New York legislature issued a statement to Congress which 
contained a threat to solve the problem by itself—through arms—if Congress would not take 
action.  “If the decision which has so long, in vain been solicited, should not be pronounced 
within two Months . . . the said State of New York with whatever deep regret will be compelled 
to consider herself as left to pursue her own Council, destitute of the protection of the United 
States, to whose judgement they have cheerfully submitted, and on whose justice they have 
hitherto relied,” they wrote.   The talk was certainly tough; New York delegate Ephraim Paine 249
suggested that the state should take “the Same measures as though it was Surrounded with open 
and avowed Enemies.”   Some delegates believed the claims, with Richard Debbs Spaight of 250
North Carolina predicted that “the flames of civil war will be kindled in that Country in the 
course of four or five months.”   This prediction was incorrect, and while the same arguments 251
were raised, New York never acted upon their threat or brought up their claim.  252
 The combination of New York’s lack of follow-through and the continued lack of 
congressional interest in the Vermont controversy led the issue to wind down until the start of the 
1787 Constitution in 1789.  During that period, American statesmen recognized the weaknesses 
of the Articles of Confederation and turned their attentions to issues much more complicated than 
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war: nation building.  Hamilton himself used the issue to expose inherent weaknesses in the 
Confederation Congress.  “It is hazardous to pass a positive judgement on what will happen in a 
body so mutable as that of Congress . . . While Congress have a discretion they will 
procrastinate; when they are bound by the constitution they must proceed.”   For ten years or 253
more, Congress procrastinated on the issue of Vermont.  But throughout that process, they 
debated the powers and limits of Congress. 
“May ‘ere long be admitted”: The Fourteenth State 
 Vermont did not follow the normal path to statehood for that time period as the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 would come to constitute the main process for entering the Union.  Onuf, in 
his 1987 Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance, described the law as “one 
of the most important documents of the American founding period . . . Drafted at a time of 
sectional division and constitutional crisis, it also embodies a vision of a more harmonious, 
powerful, prosperous, and expanding union.”   Vermont’s entry into the Union was not 254
influenced by the Northwest Ordinance; its controversy influenced the development of the 
Northwest Ordinance.  Onuf wrote that Vermont demonstrated how “frontiersman were capable 
of forming their own new states,” so Congress felt the need to anticipate similar disputes in the 
future.  255
 Vermont’s situation was much more similar to that of Kentucky, the fifteenth state, who 
also sought to split from a larger state.  In Kentucky’s case, that larger state was Virginia.  As 
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early as 1776, Kentuckians petitioned to Congress to request recognition as a separate colony, 
much like Vermont.   They were also similar in that they were well-established settlements, 256
without as much need for the procedure outlined by the Northwest Ordinance.   The Kentucky 257
situation in western Virginia was ultimately beneficial to Vermonters, as it offered a regional 
balance in the admission of both states to the Union, assuaging concerns of skeptical Southern 
delegates.  Massachusetts delegate Samuel A. Otis acknowledged the awkward nature of 
transition felt by both Vermont and Kentucky, writing that each state government was made to 
wait during the ratification period until the new government, under the 1789 Constitution, could 
approve them.   The two states were alike in the unique questions they presented to Congress. 258
 During the lead-up to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, it was all but certain to 
delegates that Vermont would be the fourteenth state.  A big step occurred in March 1787 when 
Alexander Hamilton made a motion in the New York legislature to recognize Vermont as an 
independent state.   The state that was the biggest—and often the only—obstacle to Vermont 259
statehood had now stepped aside, paving the way for statehood.  The question remained as to 
whether Vermont would enter the confederacy or wait until the 1787 Constitution took effect.  
Nathan Gilman noted that “the people in Vermont are federally inclined and much in favor of the 
new Constitution,”  and Vermonters assured Hamilton that they would not ask for any 260
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amendments while ratifying.   Ultimately, it required a new nation and a loss of interest from 261
New York for the issue to be resolved as the Continental Congress proved unable to resolve the 
situation on their own.  While delegates were frustrated at the time, the impact the controversy 
had on American institutions of government was much more far-reaching.  It helped teach the 
Founders the limits of the Articles of Confederation and showed them the need for the structure 
offered by the 1787 Constitution. 
5. Conclusion: A Vision for a Federal System 
 The Continental Congress’s failure to resolve the Vermont controversy created more 
questions about American constitutional government than it answered.  While frustrating to 
many delegates to Congress, this circumstance reflected so much of the general struggle to create 
a new nation.  Unprecedented situations faced delegates to Congress in most of their work, and 
while they related their values and ideals to the traditions of American government and colonial 
experience, nation-building was a complicated art.  For the most part, delegates involved in the 
controversy focused on personal land interests and old rivalries between the colonies.  Yet, as 
Bernstein noted, old rivalries revealed the weaknesses of the confederation.   Onuf wrote that 262
“many Americans came to believe that only a vigorous national government could prevent the 
disintegration of the states themselves.”   For this reason, some delegates thought beyond 263
short-term concerns and viewed the long-term consequences of the debate.   
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 Two key players in the Vermont controversy—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
—offered their own vision for the United States of America in the Federalist Papers, and in 
doing so elaborated upon the principles underlying the controversy.  In the new government 
formed by the 1787 Constitution, they sought to correct the flaws in the Articles of 
Confederation; flaws they observed firsthand throughout the Vermont controversy.  The prospect 
of civil war concerned Hamilton, a threat that was brought up in Congress as a potential result of 
Vermont independence.  “To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of 
independent unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighbourhood,” he wrote, “would 
be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated 
experience of ages.”   This realist view led him to believe that “the jealousy of power, or the 264
desire of equality and safety” which existed among states meant that only republican institutions 
could survive.   He identified territorial disputes as the leading cause of war between peoples 265
using Vermont as the example of its possibility in the United States.   Unlike other New York 266
Delegates in the Vermont controversy, who were more focused upon their own economic 
interests and pride for their state, Hamilton feared its implications upon a federal system.  “In a 
review of these transactions,” he wrote, “we may trace some of the causes which would be likely 
to embroil the states with each other.”   In Hamilton’s view, jealousy and distrust would always 267
exist among people, but only a document like the Constitution provided the mechanism to 
overcome them.  Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, designed to settle these disputes 
 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 6, 21.264
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between states, was never enough to settle such disputes.  In Federalist 28, he wrote that “if . . . 
insurrection should pervade a whole state, or a principal part of it, the employment of . . . force 
might become unavoidable,”  arguing that a national government with the power to peaceably 268
settle a dispute was an absolute necessity for national security.   
 The Vermont controversy involved a tension between a revolution-minded people and an 
elite party, between ideologically diverse individual, and between delegates who disagreed upon 
the true powers of their institution.  Madison saw these same points of disagreement in the 
United States as a whole.  However, the combination of a stable constitutional structure and 
diverse ideologies allowed the United States to be more successful.  As Madison argued, “the 
different governments [state and federal] will control each other; at the same time that each will 
be controled by itself . . . The society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and 
classes of citizens that the rights of individuals, or the minority, will be in little danger from 
interested combinations of the majority.”   People and power could balance one another out if 269
given the proper structure.  The Vermont controversy illustrated the value of limited government 
in a state-based federal system to Madison, Hamilton, and other Founders.   
  Reflecting the values of Hamilton and Madison, Onuf’s later work identified the solution 
called for in the Vermont controversy.  The national government required a consistent system to 
handle this and other similar jurisdictional controversies, but Congress was unwilling to give 
themselves this power whether by adding to the Articles or by legislating it to themselves.  He 
wrote that “one of the hallmarks of American constitutional development, reflecting the crisis of 
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legitimacy in new state governments, was to identify legitimate, constituent authority . . .”   270
While certain delegates sought resolution, no one sought to achieve this government stability in 
Vermont.  After numerous decades and little congressional action, no action ever took place.  The 
Vermont controversy tested the new federal balance between the states and the federal 
government.     
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Appendix I: Timeline 
1750: New Hampshire colonial Governor Bennington Wentworth began to make grants in the 
territory that would become Vermont.  It was known as the New Hampshire Grants. 
1764: The British Privy Council declared the boundary of New York “to be” the Connecticut 
River.  It served to exacerbate the dispute. 
May 8, 1776: New Hampshire Grants residents presented a petition to committee of Congress. 
May 10, 1776: Continental Congress issued resolution advising states to form their own 
governments, encouraging residents of the New Hampshire Grants. 
July 4, 1776: National Declaration of Independence approved; residents of the New Hampshire 
Grants began to turn away from Britain as a source of power. 
January 15, 1777: Vermont declares independence as the state of New Connecticut at a 
convention in Westminster, Vermont. 
June 11, 1778: Vermont legislature granted approval to the action of western New Hampshire 
towns, who sought to unite the Connecticut River Valley.  This brought New Hampshire into the 
debate on the side of New York. 
September 24, 1779: Congress passed resolutions urging involved states to give Congress 
jurisdiction to settle dispute.  It also forbade continued land grants.  A lack of quorum delayed 
hearings on the matter. 
March 1781: States ratified the Articles of Confederation. 
July 10, 1781: George Washington received intelligence revealing British overtures to Vermont 
leaders.  This information created a sense of urgency in Congress. 
August 7, 1781: Congress appointed a committee to work out terms of independence and 
statehood with Vermont. 
January 21, 1782: Delegates discovered that Vermont rejected the offer for independence.  
Vermont Gov. Thomas Chittenden confirmed this development in a letter to Congress. 
March 12, 1782: Vermont legislature passed resolutions to meet with committee to offer 
independence. 
September 21, 1782: New York officials in Cumberland County apprehended, led to crisis in 
New York over Vermont. 
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December 5, 1782: Congress passed resolution rejecting Vermont actions in Cumberland County, 
no further action came from this resolution. 
April 24, 1784: In a latter to Congress, New York Delegates threaten to take matter into their 
own hands if Congress did not decide within two months.  No further action came from this 
letter. 
September 17, 1787: United States Constitution ratified. 
March 4, 1789: First Congress met in New York City. 
March 4, 1791: Vermont became the fourteenth state in the Union. 
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Appendix II: Map of Vermont and Surrounding Area 
Reprinted from Winn L. Taplin Jr., “The Vermont Problem in the Continental Congress and in 
Interstate Relations, 1776 - 1787,” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1955).
